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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The statement of jurisdiction contained in the
first paragraph of the appellant's statement of jurisdiction
is adopted by respondent.

The remainder of the paragraphs

contained in the statement of jurisdiction are not adopted
as statements of jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The plaintiff and appellant does not appeal from
the jury's verdict, nor does it contest that the verdict is
not supported by the evidence.
The appeal has been taken on two issues. The first
is an alleged error by the trial court in admitting parole
evidence.

Respondents agree with the appellant's first

issue as stated in the statement of issues dealing with the
parole evidence question.
As to the second basis for appeal, appellant claims
error by virtue of a juror being on the panel who lived in
the same condominium complex as defendants, and by alleged
fal.se testimony from one of defendant's witnesses.
Respondents do not believe that the appellant has
correctly stated the issue with respect to its second basis
of appeal, and believes that the issue relative to the
second basis of appeal should properly be stated as raising
a question as to whether or not the jury panel was qualified
and whether challenges for cause were properly preserved and
made at the trial court level.
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Since appellant has not briefed the issue relative
to alleged false testimony of a witness, no issue is presented relative to the same.
STATUTES AND RULES
Attached as an addendum, (as "Exhibit A") to
respondent's brief, is a copy of Rule 47 of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure dealing with jurors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant and plaintiff below (hereinafter
referred to as Realty World) filed suit in the Fifth Circuit
Court against the respondents and defendants below,
(hereinafter referred to as Marsdens) seeking to recover a
real estate commission alleged to be due and owing as a
result of the sale of the Marsdens' condominium.
For its claim Realty World relied upon an agreement
attached as an addendum to this brief (as "Exhibits B and
C") entitled Sales Agency Contract (exclusive rights to sell).
The agent for Realty World, Thomas E. Eveleth, was
a personal friend of the Marsdens, and was a neighbor living
in the same condominium complex as the Marsdens.
The Marsdens claimed in defense of Realty World's
complaint, that they had entered into an agreement with
Realty World's agent, Thomas E. Eveleth, that if they found
a party who was interested in purchasing the condominium
(independent from the efforts of Realty World), then a commission would not be owing.
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Prior to the jury trial in this case, the trial
court pre-tried this case to determine what issues would be
presented at trial. Realty World did not make any claim at
the pre-trial, at the hearing on a subsequent motion concerning parole evidence, nor at the trial alleging that the
claims of fraud asserted by Marsdens had not been plead with
specificity.
At the pre-trial of the case, the trial judge
directed that the parties brief the court on issues pertaining to whether or not parole evidence concerning the oral
agreements that Marsdens desired to testify to would be
admitted by the court.
The matter was briefed, and a hearing was held by
the court.

Copies of the depositions were provided to the

court and reviewed.

As a result of the hearing, the court

rendered its order, which has been attached as an addendum
to this brief as "Exhibit Dlf . In the order, the court specifically found that:
. . . the court specifically finds
that the contracts in question and
which are relied upon by the plaintiff
are ambiguous and not integrated
agreements.
On the scheduled day for jury trial, a prospective
panel of jurors was presented and questioned by the court in
detail.

The court then allowed counsel to submit to the

court any additional questions or subject areas for inquiry
of the jury panel.

Following said questioning, counsel for
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Realty World and Marsdens passed the jury for cause, and no
challenges for cause were made by Realty World.
Prior to the trial, Realty World was aware that
Marsdens would be calling Rita Luke as a trial witness.
They were further aware as to the subject matter she would
testify to.

Her deposition was not taken prior to trial by

Realty World.
Following the trial of the case, and rendering of a
special verdict in favor of Marsdens, Realty World moved the
court for a new trial alleging that one of the jurors lived
in the same condominium complex as Marsdens, and also
alJeged that the witness, Rita Luke had testified falsely.
The court denied the motion for a new trial.

The

court reviewed its notes with counsel, and indicated that
specific questions had been asked of each juror if there was
any reason why the case could not be judged fairly by said
juror, and the answer had been in the negative by juror
Conder.
The court also noted that Realty World called no
witnesses at the trial of the case in rebuttal to witness
Rita Luke.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The trial court correctly allowed the introduction
of parole evidence by Marsdens, since a specific finding was
made by the trial court that the agreements relied upon by
Realty World were not integrated documents, and were
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ambiguous.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in

making said ruling, and in allowing parole evidence to be
introduced to the jury.
Realty World has not preserved its claims that
fraud was not plead with specificity, and even if Lt has
preserved said claims, the allegations of fraud are not the
basis upon whjch the trial court allowed the Introduction of
parole evidence, and therefore, there has been no harm
caused to Realty World.
Realty World did not preserve an issue for appeal
relative to the juror Conder.
made.

No challenge for cause was

The agent for Realty World, Thomas Eveleth, Realty

World's only witness at trial was also a resident of the
same condominium complex as Marsdens and as the juror was
aJleged to be, and that issue was not raised to the court's
attention by Mr. Eveleth.
Realty World was aware of the witness, Rita Luke,
and of the fact that she would be called at trial, and what
she would testify concerning.

Further, following her

testimony, no rebuttal witnesses were offered by Realty
World, nor was any claim made of surprise or inability to
meet the testimony of Rita Luke, and therefore, the issue is
not proper]y preserved for appeal.
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ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN
ALLOWING PAROLE EVIDENCE.
Prior to the trial of this case, a pre-trial conference was he]d between counsel for Realty World, counsel
for Marsdens, and the trial judge, Phillip K. Palmer.

The

court discussed what issues would be tried, and whether or
not there were any motions to be heard.

Realty World raised

no issue in its pleadings relative to the sufficiency of the
claims and defenses plead by Marsdens, including their claim
for fraud, and made no objections or raised any defenses to
the same at the pre-trial conference.

As a result of the

pre-trial conference, and having discussed the issues, the
trial court requested that the parties brief the issue to
the court on parole evidence and argue the matter on a
motion to admit said evidence.
The issues were briefed, and were argued to the
court.

At the argument on the motions, the court indicated

it had reviewed the briefs, and had also reviewed deposition
testimony.

Having reviewed the same and having heard the

argument of counsel, the court entered its order and specificalJy found that:
the court specifically finds that the
contracts in question and which are
relied upon by the plaintiff are
ambiguous and not integrated
agreements. (See Addendum "Exhibit
D" )
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In its brief on appeal, Realty World makes two
arguments why the trial court was in error.

The first argu-

ment is that our Supreme Court has previously construed an
identical contract and found the same to be clear and
unambiguous, and therefore parole evidence should not have
been admitted.

The second argument, is that fraud had not

been plead with specificity by Marsdens and therefore, could
not be used as a basis for alleging fraud as an exception to
the parole evidence rule.
In dealing with the two arguments of Realty World,
the second argument will be dealt with first, since a review
of the court's order makes it clear that the court did not
make its determination that parole evidence would be admitted based upon allegations of, or any finding on its part
that there was any likelihood of a finding of fraud as
against Realty World or its agent, Thomas E. Eveleth.

In

fact, the basis for the court's ruling was a finding that
the contracts relied upon by Realty World were ambiguous and
not integrated agreements.
In dealing with the first basis of claimed error by
the trial court, Realty World has relied upon the case of
E.A. Strout Western Realty Agency, Inc. vs. Broderick, 522
P.2d. 144 (Utah 1974).
The Strout case is not controlling in the case
before this court, and does not mandate a holding that
parole evidence should not be admitted based upon the facts

-7-

and circumstances that were presented to the trial judge.
In the Strout case, there had been no modification of the
document relied upon.

Further, a review of the Strout

opinion, indicates that there was not any real evidence to
support a bona fide assertion on the part of the party
claiming entitlement to admit parole evidence that there had
ever been an oral agreement reached between the parties.
Contrary to the Strout case, in this case, the document relied upon Realty World, is titled "Sales Agency
Contract", and right underneath that title is titled
"(exclusive right to sell").

Further, in paragraph two of

the agreement, it purports to require the owner of the property to be responsible to pay a real estate commission
whether the buyer is found by Realty World or by the
Marsdens.

Contrary to the title of the agreement and the

provisions of paragraph two, Realty World's agent hand wrote
onto the face of the agreement the words "3 names reserved".
Testimony from deposition which was presented to the trial
court, indicated that at a time after writing "3 names
reserved" on the face of this document (which purported to
be an exclusive right to sell) four names were presented to
Realty World's agent, rather than just three.

Therefore,

the court found that the handwriting on the face of the
agreement created an ambiguity and a question whether the
document was integrated.
The court's order is consistent with the Utah
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Supreme Court's pronouncement of the law relative to parole
evidence as stated in the Union Bank vs. Swensen case, 707
P.2d 663 (Utah 1985).

In the Union Bank case, the Supreme

Court stated that:
the parole evidence ruLe, as a principal of contract interpretation, has a
very narrow application. Simply
stated, the rule operates in the
absence of fraud to exclude
contemporaneous conversations, statements or representations offered for
the purpose of varying or adding to
the terms of an integrated contract,
(quoting from page 665 of the
opinion).
Using the standard of narrow application assigned
by the Supreme Court, the court in Union Bank then when on
to note that in all cases where parole evidence becomes an
issue, the threshold question concerning whether the parties
intended the subject writing to be an integrated agreement,
must be answered.

Commenting on this threshold question,

the court stated that:
therefore,, a court must first determine whether the writing was intended
by the parties to be an integration.
In resolving this preliminary question
of fact, parole evidence, indeed, any
relative evidence is admissable.
(quoting from page 665 of the
opinion).
When the trial judge ruled on the admissability of
the evidence, he had reviewed the pleadings and deposition
testimony and it was represented by counsel for both Realty
World and Marsdens that the testimony that was anticipated
to be offered would be testimony from the Marsdens claiming
-9-

that before they signed the sales agency contract, that they
had specifically discussed with the agent (who had been a
friend and was a neighbor in the same condominium complex
with them), the fact that they would not be required to pay
a real estate commission if they sold the condominium to a
party who had not been introduced to the property, or
brought to the property by Realty World,

The testimony was

also presented to the court, that Marsdens would testify
that the person who purchased the property, in fact, was not
introduced to the Marsdens, nor did he become aware of the
property through any of the efforts of Realty World.

That

individual was Paul Stevens, and was deposed prior to trial
and also testified at trial as stated.
The Union Bank case also establishes that at a
minimum, all relevant evidence is admissable on the threshold issue of whether the writing was adopted by the parties
as an integration of their agreement.
The trial court was aware of the various claims of
the parties, the testimony that would be offered, and had
reviewed the agreement knowing that parole evidence would
have been admissable for threshold purposes anyway, and was
properly admissable as competent evidence to establish
Marsdens' claim as to the agreement that they felt had been
reached.

It is also important to note that the jury, as the

finder of fact, also felt the evidence was probative, since
its verdict supported the Marsdens1 claim that an oral
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agreement had been reached as testified to.
If Realty World felt that there was a good faith
basis for claiming that the trial judge erred in admitting
parole evidence, certainly it would have requested a transcript of the hearing held before the judge on the issue of
parole evidence, and also at the trial of the case.
When the parole evidence was offered at trial, the
same should have been preserved by objection, with a transcript for this court to review.
II.
REALTY WORLD HAS NOT PRESERVED ISSUES
RELATIVE TO THE SELECTION OF THE JURY
AND ALLEGED FALSE TESTIMONY FOR
APPEAL.
It is alleged that the proceedings were "tainted"
by false testimony from one of defendant's witnesses in the
statement of issues presented by Realty World.

That issue

has not been briefed, and Marsdens feel that the same was
not preserved at the trial court level. Further, on appeal,
by not briefing the same, the issue is really not before
this court.

Should the court determine that the issue has

been preserved, it is difficult for Marsdens to anticipate
what may be argued in that regard.
If Realty World argues that one of defendants1
witnesses, Rita Luke, testified falsely, there was no objection made on that basis to her testimony at trial. No
motions were made that Realty World was surprised or prejudiced by the testimony, and more importantly, no rebuttal
-11-

evidence was presented.

After trial, by motion for a new

trial, Realty World argued to the trial court that the testimony was false and presented an affidavit from a potential
witness, but gave no explanation for why that person had not
been called as a rebuttal witness at the trial of the case.
III.
JURY SELECTION WAS LAWFUL
Realty World claims that juror Lee Verl Conder was
a resident of the same condominium complex as Marsdens, and
therefore tainted the proceedings.
It should be noted that the agent of Realty World,
Thomas E. Eveleth, was a resident of the same condominium
complex as Marsdens as well.

Mr. Eveleth was present during

the selection of the jury.
Counsel was given an opportunity to ask all jurors
any questions that had not already been asked by the court
by directing additional questions to the court.
A full opportunity for questioning occurred, and
then the jury panel was passed for cause.

No challenges for

cause were made by Realty World.
Rule 47(f) requires that challenges for cause be
made for the grounds indicated for ruling by the trial
court.

Subparagraph 6 of Rule 47(f) provides a challenge

for cause:
that a state of mind exists on the
part of the juror with reference to
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the cause, or to either party, which
will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the
substantial rights of the party
challenging; . . .
There was no challenge made to Mr. Conder by Realty
World.

Further, no preemptory challenge was made to Mr.

Conder, and the information was certainly just as available
to Realty World and its agent, Thomas E. Eveleth, who sat at
counsel table during jury selection as it was to the
Marsdens.

Further, there has been no evidence presented

that Mr. Conder, in fact, acted with any bias or prejudice
as contemplated by the Rule.
When this issue was raised to the trial court in a
motion for a new trial, the trial court specifically
referred back to its notes and indicated to counsel that
questions had been asked to the jury specifically dealing
with whether or not there was any bias or reason that a particular juror would not fairly judge the facts from the evidence presented, and Mr. Conder did not indicate that he
would have any bias or prejudice.

In the Jenkins vs.

Parrish, 627 P.2d. 533 (Utah 1981), case relied upon by
Realty World, a juror specifically gave reason to the trial
court to believe that she would have a problem in fairly
judging the case.

There is no such evidence in this case.

Further, the Utah Supreme Court has been faced with cases
where there has been an actual relationship or some
knowledge, and has indicated that it was not error to leave
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a juror on the panel.

In the case of State vs. Baran, 474

P.2d. 728 (Utah 1970), the Supreme Court was faced with a
challenge that error had been committed by leaving certain
members of the jury panel on the panel.

The alleged grounds

were, that "eight members had been victims of robbery, two
had previously read about defendant in the newspaper, one
had served on a jury in 1954 on a robbery case, and one
lived in the same neighborhood as defendant's estranged
wife".

In the court's opinion, it was indicated that all of

the eight members were questioned and responded that they
held no opinions of bias or prejudice.

Therefore, the

Supreme Court indicated under the facts in the Baran case,
that:
in the instant action, the trial court
conscientiously interrogated the members of the jury panel. Not one of
the members stated that he had previously formed or expressed an opinion,
and each indicated that he would act
wit}) impartiality. The grounds
asserted by defendant do not constitute actual bias as defined in
§77-30-18(2).
In this case, the trial judge indicated and in
fact, conscientiously interrogated the members of the jury
panel.

That fact is supported by the record, and once again

the record has not been requested in the form of a transcript by Realty World, and therefore there is no support
for Its claims in regard to juror Conder.
In the case of C.R. Owens Trucking Corporation vs.
Stewart, 509 P.2d. 821 (Utah 1973), the plaintiff appealed
-14-

claiming error in the jury selection.

In the court's

opinion, the examination of jurors was referred to, and the
court stated that:
That examination, which is made a part
of the record here, indicates that the
prospective jurors did have an
acquaintance with the defendant,
however, it is shown that the court
was carefuL to exclude from the paneL
the Veniremen who indicated bias or
prejudice in favor of the defendant or
who indicated a desire to be excused
from sitting on the case. At the conclusion of the examination, counsel
for the plaintiff challenged for
cause, nine members of the panel, on
the grounds that they were acquainted
with the defendant, and also on the
basis that they or their spouses were
engaged in raising livestock. The
plaintiff's challenges for cause do
not fall without the grounds specified
in Rule 47(f) U.R.C.P., and the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in
not removing from the panel, the
jurors challenged.
It is clear from the Barans case and C.R. Owens
case, that even if Mr. Conder was a resident of the same
condominium complex, and even if he did know the Marsdens
and/or Mr. Eveleth, that the same would not have been
grounds to have removed him from the jury panel, and therefore there has been no prejudicial error committed even if
the issue is deemed to have been preserved for appeal.
CONCLUSION
Respondents Marsdens respectfully request the court
affirm the trial court's ruling, admitting parole evidence
and affirm the jury's verdict in the case, finding that

-15-

there was no error or irregularity in the jury panel presented as potential trial jurors in the case.
DATED this

day of January, 1988.
STRONG Sc HANNI

By.
Paul M. Belnap
Attorney for Defendants/
Respondents Marsden

CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on this

day of

January, 1988 I hand-delivered the foregoing to the
fol]owing:
James H. Deans, Esq.
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
175 South Main Street, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM

EXHIBIT A

Rule 47

UTAH RULEb OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
Cross-References. - Objections to mstructions to jury, Rule 51

Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
Rule 46, F R C P

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Form of verdict
—Duty to examine and object
Instructions
—Right to object
Harmless error
Cited
their accuracy; if counsel was prevented from
making objections to instructions, he should,
under this rule, be deemed to have done so
Hanks v Chnstensen, 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P 2d
564 11960)

F o r m of verdict.
—Duty to e x a m i n e a n d object.
Counsel has the obligation not onh to object
to the form of the verdict, but to affirmatively
seek to examine it, by failing to request court
permission to examine the verdict and make
objection tc it. partv waived any objection to
the verdict form Martineau v Anderson. 636
P 2 d 1039 (Utah 1981).

Harmless error.
If the instructions are correct, any error
which prevents counsel from making objections
thereto is harmless error
Hanks v.
Chnstensen. 11 Utah 2d 8, 354 P 2d 564
(1960)

Instructions.
—Right to object.
The parties have a right to make objections
to the instructions to preserve challenges to

Cited in Watters
(Utah 1981)

Querry 626 P 2d 455

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 4 Am Jur 2d Appeal and
Error $ 5 0 1 5 Am J u r 2d Appeal and Error
^ 545, 553, 558
C.J.S. — 4 C J S Appeal and Error ^ 228
et seq , 324
A.L.R. — Sufficiency in federal court of mo-

tion in limine to preserve for appeal objection
to evidence absent contemporary objection at
trial. 76 A L R Fed 619
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «= 169
et seq , 248

Rule 47. Jurors.
(a) Examination of jurors. The court may permit the parties or their
attorneys to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event, the court shall permit the parties or
their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as is
material and proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions of the parties or their attorneys as is material and proper.
(b) Alternate jurors. The court may direct that one or two jurors in addition to the regular panel be called and impanelled to sit as alternate jurors.
Alternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who,
prior to the time the jury retires to consider its verdict, become unable or
disqualified to perform their duties. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the
same manner, shall have the same qualifications, shall be subject to the same
examination and challenges, shall take the same oath, and shall have the
same functions, powers, facilities, and privileges as the principal jurors. An
alternate juror who does not replace a principal juror shall be discharged after
130
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Rule 47

the jury retires to consider its verdict. If one or two alternate jurors are called
each party is entitled to one peremptory challenge in addition to those otherwise allowed. The additional peremptory challenge may be used only against
an alternate juror, and the other peremptory challenges allowed by law shall
not be used against the alternates.
(c) Challenge defined, by whom made. A challenge is an objection made
to the trial jurors and may be directed (1 to the panel or (2) to an individual
uror. Either party may challenge the jurors, but where there are several
Darties on either side, they must join in a challenge before it can be made.
(d) Challenge to panel; time and manner of taking; proceedings. A
•hallenge to the panel can be founded only on a material departure from the
brms prescribed in respect to the drawing and return of the jury, or on the
ntentional omission of the proper officer to summon one or more of the jurors
Irawn. It must be taken before a juror is sworn. It must be in writing or be
loted by the reporter, and must specifically set forth the facts constituting the
round of challenge. If the challenge is allowed, the court must discharge the
iry so far as the trial in question is concerned.
e» Challenges to individual jurors; number of peremptory chalmges. The challenges to individual jurors are either peremptory or for cause,
lach party shall be entitled to three peremptory challenges, except as proided under Subdivisions (b) and (c) of this rule.
(f) Challenges for cause; how tried. Challenges for cause may be taken
i one or more of the following grounds:
(1) A want of any of the qualifications prescribed by law to render a
person competent as a juror.
(2) Consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree to either party,
or to an officer of a corporation that is a party.
(3) Standing in the relation of debtor and creditor, guardian and ward,
master and servant, employer and employee or principal and agent, to
either party, or united in business with either party, or being on any bond
or obligation for either party; provided, that the relationship of debtor
and creditor shall be deemed not to exist between a municipality and a
resident thereof indebted to such municipality by reason of a tax, license
fee, or service charge for water power, light or other services rendered to
such resident.
(4) Having served as a juror, or having been a witness, on a previous
trial between the same parties for the same cause of action, or being then
a witness therein.
(5) Pecuniary interest on the part of the juror in the result of the action, or in the main question involved in the action, except his interest as
a member or citizen of a municipal corporation.
(6) That a state of mind exists on the part of the juror with reference to
the cause, or to either party, which will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to the substantial rights of the party challenging; but no person shall be disqualified as a juror by reason of having
formed or expressed an opinion upon the matter or cause to be submitted
to such jury, founded upon public rumor, statements in public journal or
common notoriety, if it satisfactorily appears to the court that the juror
can and will, notwithstanding such opinion, act impartially and fairly
upon the matter to be submitted to him.
131
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Any challenge for cause shall be tried by the court The juror challenged
and any other person, may be examined as a witness on the trial of such
challenge
(g) Selection of jury. The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of
jurors that are to trv the cause plus such an additional number as will allow
for all peremptory challenges permitted After each challenge for cause sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the vacancy before further challenges are made, and any such new juror may be challenged for cause When
the challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall make a list of the jurors
remaining in the order called, and each side, beginning with the plaintiff,
shall indicate thereon its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in
regular turn until all peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived The
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many of them as shall be
necessary to constitute the jury, in the order m which they appear on the list,
and the persons whose names are so called shall constitute the jury
(h) Oath of jury. As soon as the jury is completed an oath must be administered to the jurors, in substance, that thev and each of them will well and
truly try the matter m issue between the parties, and a true verdict rendered
according to the evidence and the instructions of the court
(1) Proceedings when juror discharged. If, after the impanelling of the
jury and before verdict, a juror becomes unable or disqualified to perform his
duty and there is no alternate juror the parties may agree to proceed with the
other jurors or to swear a new juror and commence the trial anew If the
parties do not so agree the court shall discharge the jury and the case shall be
tried with a new jury
(j) View by jury. When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the jury
to have a \ lew of the property which is the subject of litigation or of the place
in which any material fact occurred, it may order them to bt conducted in a
body under the charge of an officer to the place, which shall be shown to them
bv some person appointed by the court for that purpose While the jury are
thus absent no person other than the person so appointed shall speak to them
on any subject connected with the trial
(k) Separation of jury. If the jurors are permitted to separate, either during the trial or after the case is submitted to them, they shall be admonished
by the court that it is their duty not to converse with, or suffer themselves to
be addressed by, any other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is
their duty not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them
(1) Deliberation of jury. When the case is finally submitted to the jury
they may decide in court or retire for deliberation If they retire they must be
kept together in some convenient place under charge of an officer until they
agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
Unless by order of the court, the officer having them under his charge must
not suffer any communication to be made to them, or make any himself,
except to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he must not,
before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the state of their
dehbe ations or the verdict agreed upon
(m) Papers taken by jury. Upon retiring for deliberation the jury may
take with them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and all papers
which have been received as evidence in the cause, except depositions
copies of such papers as ought not, in the opinion of the court, to be taken from
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the person having them in possession; and they may also take with them
notes of the testimony or other proceedings on the trial taken by themselves
or any of them, but none taken by any other person.
(n) Additional instructions of jury. After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there is a disagreement among them as to any part of the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause,
they may require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon their being
brought into court the information required must be given in the presence of,
or after notice to, the parties or counsel. Such information must be given in
writing or taken down by the reporter.
(o) New trial when no verdict given. If a jury is discharged or prevented
from giving a verdict for any reason, the action shall be tried anew.
(p) Court deemed in session pending verdict; verdict may be sealed.
While the jury is absent the court may be adjourned from time to time in
respect to other business, but it shall be open for every purpose connected with
the cause submitted to the jury, until a verdict is rendered or the jury discharged. The court may direct the jury to bring in a sealed verdict at the
opening of the court, in case of an agreement during a recess or adjournment
for the day.
(q) Declaration of verdict. When the jury or three-fourths of them, or
such other number as may have been agreed upon by the parties pursuant to
Rule 48, have agreed upon a verdict they must be conducted into court, their
names called by the clerk, and the verdict rendered by their foreman; the
verdict must be in writing, signed by the foreman, and must be read by the
:lerk to the jury, and the inquiry made whether it is their verdict. Either
party may require the jury to be polled, which shall be done by the court or
:lerk asking each juror if it is his verdict. If, upon such inquiry or polling
there is an insufficient number of jurors agreeing therewith, tht jury must be
sent out again; otherwise the verdict is complete and the jury shall be dis:harged from the cause.
(r) Correction of verdict. If the verdict rendered is informal or insuffi:ient, it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or the jury
nay be sent out again.
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to
*ule 47^a) and (b), F.R.C.P.
Cross-References. — Jurors generally,
; 78-46-1 et seq.

Three-fourths of jurors may find verdict in
civil case, Utah Const.. Art. I, Sec. 10.
Witness, juror as, § 78-24-3; Rule 606,
U.R.E.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Additional instructions.
-Absence of counsel.
Prejudice.
-Entry of judge into jury room
'hallenges for cause.
-Acquaintance with party.
-Bias or prejudice.
Malpractice.
Waiver of right to challenge.
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EXHIBIT B

FORM A

SALES AGENCY CONTRACT
(Exclusive Right To Sell)

Member of Multiple Listing Service of Salt Lake Board of REAL TORS*
1. In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on form B and to use
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor. I hereby grant you for the period statea
herein, from date hereof, the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said property or any part
thereof, at the price and terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to which I may agree in
writing.
2. During the life of this contract, if you find a party who is ready, able and willing to buy. lease
or exchange said property or any part thereof, at said price and terms, or any other price or terms, to
which I may agree in writing, or if said properly or any part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged
during said term by myself or any other party. I agree to pay the broker listed below a commission of
$
m Z H _ _ . or O*
% of such sale, lease or exchange price which commission unless otherwise agreed in writing, shall be due and payable on the date of closing the sale, lease or exchange.
Should said properly be sold, leased or exchanged within
^
months after such expiration to
any party to whom the property was offered or shown by me. or you. or any other party during the
term of this listing, I agree to pay you the commission above stated if I am not obligated to pay a
commission on such sale, lease or exchange to another broker pursuant to another sales agency
contract entered into after the expiration date of this contract.
3. You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on
the property as described on the property description and informational form (form B). Said deposit
to be held in a trust account.
4. I hereby warrant the information contained on the property description and informational
form (form B) to be correct and that I have marketable title or an otherwise established right to sell,
lease or exchange said property, except as stated. I agree to execute the necessary .documents of
conveyance or lease and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses
affecting said property to agreed date of possession and to furnish a good and marketable title with
abstract to date or at my option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and in
the name of the purchaser. In the event of sale or lease of other than real property, I agree to provide
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to sell, lease or exchange.
5. In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement. I
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection.
6. You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other party
holding a lien or interest on this property.
7. You are hereby authorized and instructed to offer this property through the Multiple Listing
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS®.
8. You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property.
9. This Sales Agency Contract may not be changed, modified or altered except by prior written
consent executed by the Principal Broker and the owner(s) shown below, except that the listed price
shall be changed by written request received from the owner(s).
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons based on race, color,
religion, sex or natjonal origin in connection with the sale, lease or exchange of properties under
this agreement.
C\ fc„, j , c S
/^c.
$ s t ^ iS <~ < '
LISTED PROPERTY

/ / / ^

/T.

">' <T- Z-.
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(Address)

(S '
(City)

LISTED PRICE.
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This contract is entered into this
This contract expires on the
^^^^

H '-*
(State)

J~c o
/

/ 7

/

day of

A<

day of

/

f

19

'

•*''/

,

w

, ^ ' ^ *"/

Listing Company

ipai Barter (Insert Name)

1^

,

/
/ 'Z? >"•'£•
'^c£

Ownej-^Sigrtfturef'/-''£• ^

Owner (Signature)

BY^
Authorr*#d Agent (Signature)^"

I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed copies of this document (Form A) and the property
description and information form (Form B).

-frr-

Complete both Form A end Form 8
1 copy to owner — « copy 10 listing oflice
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EXHIBIT C

PORMTA
^ ^

SALES AGENCY CONTRACT
(Exclusive Right To Sell)

Member oYMultiple Listing Service dTSalt Lake Board of REALTORS**
1 In consideration of your agreement to list the property described on form B and to use
reasonable efforts to find a purchaser or tenant therefor. I hereby grant you for the period stated
herein, from date hereof, the exclusive right to sell, lease or exchange said property or any part
thereof, at the price and terms stated herein, or at such other price or terms to which I may agree in
writing
2 During the life of this contract, if you find a party who is ready able and willing to buy lease
or exchange said property or any part thereof, at said price and terms or any other price or terms to
which I may agree in wnting or if said property or any part thereof is sold leased or exchanged
during said term by myself or any other party, I agree to pay the broker listed below a commission of
$
^
o r _ _ f c Z _ % of such sale, lease or exchange price which commission unless otherwise agreed in writing, shall be due and payable on the date ofpJosing the sale lease or exchange
Should said property be sold leased or exchanged within
^ ^
months after such expiration to
any party to whom the property was offered or shown by me. or you or any other party during the
term of this listing, I agree to pay you the commission above stated if I am not obligated to pay a
commission on such sale, lease or exchange to another broker pursuant to another sales agency
contract entered into after the expiration date of this contract
3 You are hereby authorized to accept a deposit as earnest money from any potential buyer on
the properly as described on the property description and informational form (form B) Said deposit
to be held in a trust account
4 I hereby warrant the information contained on the property description and informational
form (form B) to be correct and that I have marketable title or an otherwise established right to sell,
lease or exchange said property, except as stated I agree to execute the necessary .documents of
conveyance or lease and to prorate general taxes, insurance, rents, interest and other expenses
affecting said property to agreed date of possession and to furnish a good and marketable title with
abstract to date or at my option a policy of title insurance in the amount of the purchase price and in
the name of the purchaser In the event of sale or lease of other than real property, I agree to provide
proper conveyance and acceptable evidence of title or right to sell, lease or exchange
5 In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement. I
agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee and ail costs of collection
6 You are hereby authorized to obtain financial information from any mortgagee or other party
holding a lien or interest on this property
7 You are hereby authorized and instructed to offer this property through the Multiple Listing
Service of the Salt Lake Board of REALTORS*
8 You are hereby authorized to place an appropriate sign on said property
9 This Sales Agency Contract may not be changed modified or altered except by prior written
consent executed by the Principal Broker and the owner(s) shown below, except that the listed price
shall be changed by written request received from the owner(s)
The parties hereto agree not to discriminate against any person or persons based on race, color
religion, sex or national origin in connection with the sale, lease or exchange of properties under
this agreement
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This contract is entered into t h i s _ 2 _ S _ day of
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This contract expires on tha
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/

Owntr (S^nalura)

L*
O w n r (Signature)

I hereby acknowledge receipt of completed copies of this document (Form A) and the properly
description and information form (Form B)
-,
y

/ i
Complete both form A, and Form 6
1 copy to ownar — 1 obsy to latmg office

Ownar
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EXHIBIT D

Paul M. Belnap, 0279
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Defendants
Sixth Floor Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-7080
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
REALTY WORLD STONEBROOK,

:

Plaintiff,

:

JAMES L. MARSDEN and
DONNA R. MARSDEN,

:

ORDER ON DEFENDANTS!S MOTION
TO ADMIT PAROLE EVIDENCE

vs.
Civil No.

873000185-CV

Defendants and
Third-Party Plaintiffs,
vs.

:

THOMAS E. EVELETH,

:

Third-Party Defendant.
The above entitled matter came before the court on the defendants'
motion to admit parole evidence on the 12th day of June, 1987 at the
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Phillip K. Palmer with counsel
for the plaintiff appearing and counsel for the defendants appearing.
The Court having reviewed the memorandum, depositions and exhibits submitted by counsel, and having heard the arguments of counsel, it is
HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that the defendant's
motion to admit parole evidence is granted, and the court specifically
finds that the contracts in question and which are relied upon by
the plaintiff are ambiguous and not integrated agreements.

DATED this f®

day of July, 1987.
BY THE COURT

rcuit Court Judge

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing to the following, postage prepaid on this
}3r

day of July, 1987.
Mr. James K. Deans
Attorney for Plaintiff
175 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

By

-2-
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